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Abstract 
We know that the systems which are trusted by the users are more often used, especially in a risky situation where they need 
to delegate control, but we still ignore largely which are the factors which improve trust in the systems. Our issue here was to 
explore if the way we present the system to the users will have an effect on their confidence in it. 
In this study, we had nine subjects using for the first time a Cruise Control System on open road; before, we present the 
system to them in three different ways: a function-oriented written presentation (G1); a use-oriented written presentation, 
“augmented” with difficult situations (G2); a use-oriented film presentation (3). They evaluate their trust in the system on 
scales before the whole experiment, after the presentation and after the real use. At the end, they also have self-confrontation 
interviews, where they see the video of their driving and describe their activity, strategies and feelings. We then develop 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of trust, linked with specific situations of action. 
Our results indicate that the presentation of instructions lowers the evaluation of trust (and of efficiency) that conductors have 
a priori; they had constructed an a priori representation of a CCS that is rather idealistic, and realise, after reading of the 
instructions, and above all after having watched a film, that its use is not so obvious as they had previously thought. There is 
thenceforth a drop in trust that nevertheless goes up again after use of the system during driving. We remark, from qualitative 
analyses of use experience of the regulator in real driving conditions that this drop in trust in the system does not inhibit 
subjects in their use, and in particular, for subjects who have watched a film of projection into use. They know more of the 
functions of the system in driving conditions, they produce less distorted reconstruction of the functioning, and they have a 
deeper level of understanding of the system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Delegation of control and trust need 
The use of a new technological tool, whether it is a question of human-machine or human-human 
mediated cooperation, leads to transformation of human activity, often in the direction of a 
modification of the control and the initiative of the activity by the user. Mastery of the situation and of 
the power to act can thus diminish; and this loss of control, that is delegated to another human or 
machine, may be compensated for by trust that it is acceptable. It may be very uncomfortable to 
delegate the control of an activity to a tool or to a person that one does not trust. People tend to seek 
emotional comfort and well-being, and in a risky situation which can generate fear for instance, they 
will need to interact with an object or a person that they trust, to reduce this feeling of fear and to 
reinstall emotional comfort again. We define this notion of emotional comfort and discomfort (Cahour 
2008) as a global feeling, which is dynamically constructed through the affective states (trust, fear, 
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 surprise,…) lived by a user during a specific activity, and which involves the body and the mind. It is 
important to consider the comfort/discomfort of the users, besides their efficiency and performance, 
for the ergonomic evaluation and design, since the effective use of new tools depends on both (El 
Jaafari & al. El 08). Lheureux & al (2004) find that, among users of the cruise control systems, the two 
most frequently cited motives, for owning such a system are “comfort” (around 40%) and “not having 
to worry about police checks” (around 35%), which is, according to us, a typical issue of emotional 
comfort too. 
In a risk situation (such as that of driving a car) and in environments whose evolution is uncertain, 
human beings are potentially threatened and rendered fragile; they thus need to consider that the tools 
that they use are reliable and efficient, and that they can predict their behaviour, otherwise they could 
involve taking personal risks, of accident for instance.  
Trust (and distrust, which is its inseparable opposite) has been studied in relation to control of 
dynamic systems (Amalberti, 1996; Muir, 1994; Rajaonah et al., 2003), often within interpersonal 
frameworks (Rempel et al., 1985; Josang et al., 2005). Muir and Moray (1996) have shown that the 
use of an automatic system increases as a function of the trust that is accorded to it, and a new system 
for assisting driving, that modifies the control of the activity of changing gear, seems to be particularly 
susceptible to depending on this sentiment of trust; Rajaonah et al. (2003) have in any case shown that 
the less drivers have trust in a regulator, the more they prefer to deactivate it.  
One of the functions of trust is to reduce complexity and uncertainty (Muir, 1994); since one of the 
characteristics of a complex system is that the interactions between components are unpredictable, 
when one reduces complexity by making one element in the environment reliable and predictable 
(trustable), it allows the subject to limit the perceived risk. 
 
1.2. Trust as an affective feeling 
(Dis)trust is defined here as a sentiment2 resulting from knowledge, beliefs, emotions and other 
elements derived from lived or transmitted experience, that generates positive or negative expectations 
concerning the reactions of a system and the interaction with it (whether it is a question of another 
human being, of an organisation or a technology). Assumed predictability and reliability are at the 
heart of this sentiment, which implies that the other will not put one in a risky or threatening situation. 
The subject can thus delegate control to such a system because he knows how it functions and can 
anticipate its reactions that he knows will not present risk to himself. We emphasise here the fact that 
(dis)trust is a sentiment and not a simple intellectual representation, constructed upon rational bases. 
According to us, it is an affective state, since one gives one’s trust a little like one gives one’s 
friendship, that is to say, on the basis of diverse indications and prior beliefs, but also on the basis of 
personal dispositions (which can, besides, vary according to context and mood) and shared relational 
experience, without always having a clear and exhaustive representation of the reasons that make one 
attribute or not a feeling of trust (this being just as valid for a system as for a human being). Also 
trust/distrust has a bodily component and is often associated with release and tension, and with a level 
of personal control and vigilance; people who trust the system (or person) they interact with, relax 
their attention and vigilance, whereas they are tense and much more in a controlling position when 
feeling distrust. Certain authors maintain that trust results from efforts that human beings make to 
overcome their fears, that it is not a rational reaction faced with uncertainty, but rather a reaction faced 
with the fear generated by such uncertainty (Gléonnec, 2004). Uncertainty and absence of control over 
a situation would thus be unbearable and trust would be a need to limit frightening uncertainty. As 
defined by influent authors in psychology of emotion (Scherer & al 2005, Lazarus 1991, Frijda 1986), 
affective feelings are generated by an “appraisal” by the subject of the situation/object relatively to 
his/her psychological comfort (or well-being). The subject in a situation that he/she evaluates as risky 
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 and uncertain feels emotionally uncomfortable and needs to feel trust for the object he wants to 
delegate control to. 
We can summarize our representation of trust by saying that, in an actual relation of risk and control 
delegation with an object, the emotional comfort of the subjects (which is the central motivation for 
using an assistance system) depends on their level of trust or distrust in the object. When they feel it as 
reliable (no risky for themselves) and predictable, it then reduces complexity and uncertainty and 
increases the emotional comfort. 
 
1.3. Trust and presentation of a cruise control system  
The device studied here concerns the initial taking into use of a cruise control system within real 
driving; driving is a risky activity that takes place within a complex and evolving situation, and what is 
at stake for drivers is to delegate part of their activities (Malaterre & Saad, 1986), i.e. the management 
of speed, to a new system that they discover. Through his actions and perceptions, the driver tries to 
understand the system, its reactions and limits, and what he can expect from it. With the cruise control 
system, the role of the driver changes with respect to control. Instead of acting directly, the driver 
therefore becomes a supervisor (Scardigli, 1996), notably in ensuring transitions when the system 
arrives at the limits of its domain of action (for instance when the traffic is heavy, the system is often 
disconnected with short and non-conscious brakes). The way in which the conductor is informed in 
advance about these modifications (see the list of scenarios §2.1) then becomes the main aspect at 
stake. Such understanding and anticipation is initially constructed through the presentation of the 
system that is made to the driver. It is thus important to detail how the means of presenting the system, 
in order to try to make it understandable and predictable, will influence trust and use. 
It has become classical to distinguish the logic of functioning from the logic of use (Richard, 1983): in 
the function-oriented logic, one begins from the system and actions on it, towards their consequences, 
what its manipulation leads to as a modification of the environment and for the subject (“if one does 
this, one gets that”); in the use-oriented logic, one begins from the intentions of the user, his needs in 
terms of actions on the environment (“if one wants this, one does that”). This second logic appears to 
be more appropriate for presenting information to the automobile driver, who is above all guided by 
intentions of actions and looking for means to carry them out. Sarter & al (1997) also stress that a 
training based on experience is preferable to a learning focused on the knowledge of the model of 
system functioning. The remaining question concerns the modes of communication by which this 
information should be presented: either the classical mode of written instructions or else the 
audiovisual mode that reproduces the driving environment and the visual context in which actions are 
performed. 
 
1.4. Hypothesis 
We begin from the observation that current written instruction booklets are most often insufficient as 
accompanying measures for taking charge of cruise control systems. We thus seek to determine what 
could be the impact of a new integrated approach, called ‘projection into use’, involving the use of a 
film to immerge the user into the principal evolutions of the driving situations with which he will be 
confronted.  
The objective of this experimentation is thus to test a new means of accompanying the taking control 
of an assistance for driving, within the general hypothesis that, prior to an initial trying out of the 
system, the projection into use using a film will allow : 
- improvement of the degree of the subjective feeling of trust in the system (identified from evaluation 
scales and self-confrontation interviews), we think that watching the film of the real situations that the 
user will encounter (and that could potentially surprise him) can modify the trust that he will construct 
with respect to the system, and on the appropriation of the new system that he will develop. 
- greater exploration during the first try-out, which is an indirect sign of trust; a ‘projection into use’ 
will facilitate initial taking under control by allowing the reactions of the system in different driving 
 situations to be anticipated, which will itself lead to more free and exploratory action. The exploration 
of complex functions will be identified from self-confrontation interviews and video analysis. 
- better understanding of the functions and limits of the system following the first try-out, identified 
from the responses to questions on the functions (see below). 
We present here a pre-study with nine subjects, developed in an industrial context (with time 
constraints and prototype availability constraints) and with an ecological (video recording driving in 
naturalistic context) and mainly clinical perspective. These ecological methodologies are more 
complex and time-consuming than with a driving simulator but their ecological validity is essential in 
our view because we can doubt that risk is lived and treated exactly the same way by a subject when 
the situation is real or simulated. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Ecological and clinical approach  
The methodology we have developed emphasises the natural driving activity and how it is experienced 
by the subjects. It is clinical in the sense that it is a case-study which tries to understand in depth the 
behaviour of the subjects rather than focusing on quantitative significance of the phenomena. The 
number of subjects is reduced but we have a large quantity of different types of data concerning each 
of them. 
It is a matter of at the same time observing driving activity in natural situations after different 
presentations of the system, and of articulating these analyses with what is ‘lived’ or experienced by 
subject., in a phenomenological sense (what they thought, perceived, felt, during this activity). In this 
study, the focus is more on the subjective experience of the subject (through self-confrontation 
interviews and subjective scales) because we define trust as an affective feeling, highly subjective like 
all feelings, and not much observable through the behaviour of the subjects. Some emotions, like fear 
or surprise, can be expressed by the mimics of the subjects, but the feeling of trust is not directly 
observable on the mimics. For this reason we mainly focused on subjective verbalisations and scales. 
We have to stress that self-confrontation interviews are kind of a mix between subjective and objective 
data since the subject is commenting the video of his past actions and perceptions. He/she is using the 
video of the real activity (objective data) to remember his/her feelings and thoughts at that moment 
(subjective point of view). 
Concerning the behaviour of the subjects, the observable cues which could indirectly be a sign of 
trust/distrust are not so numerous and are rather ambiguous3. We used one of them as a sign of 
trust/distrust : the way users explore the functions of the system. During the trial, if they stick to the 
basic functions of the new system, it shows that they are not very at ease with its use, but if they 
explore more expansively the different possibilities of the system, it indicates that they are in a 
mastering and trusting position. 
The data is thus constituted of: 
(1) Subjective scales concerning trust in the system filled in by subjects, at three different moments; 
(2) Filmed driving activity; video data of real driving activity;  
(2) Self-confrontation interviews with subjects just after the activity, based on the video-recording;  
(4) Questions on the functions of the system. 
We develop each category of data in the following parts.  
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 2.2 Presentations of the system 
Three modes of presentation of the system have been elaborated and presented before driving with the 
cruise control system: 
- G1: a function-oriented written presentation, which corresponds to what exists today, being the 
written user manual; 
- G2: a use-oriented written presentation, “augmented” with respect to the present situation, using 
situations that are difficult to manage; 
- G3:a use-oriented film presentation (i.e. one which is explicit concerning situations that are difficult 
to manage). This consists of a video recording made of use situations on the real road, filmed over the 
shoulder of the driver, with his spoken commentaries and those of an expert co-pilot, who explains the 
system to the driver. The G2 and G3 presentations have very similar content. 
The principle and the objective of ‘projection into use’ is to make a scenario of the principal new 
situations that the user will encounter and which can be potentially a source of surprise or 
misunderstanding, in order to facilitate his initial use of the system, to reinforce trust and to favour 
exploration of the system and its functionalities. Different scenarios were presented in the augmented 
manual, as well as in the film. The goal of the scenarios was thus to be representative of new situations 
that will be presented to the driver who discovers the system. It should be emphasised that the system 
that was used was a prototype of an application that is undergoing design. 
The list of scenarios, constructed on the basis of a previous study of use of a cruise control system 
(Timianguel, 2005), that are included in the augmented user manual (G2) and depicted in the film of 
projection into use (G3), in addition to more classical explanations of functioning, is the following: 
- a situation of overtaking a vehicle: illustration of use of the accelerator pedal in order to provoke an 
intentional state of “over-speed”; 
- a situation of a steep hill, for illustrating a non-intentional state of over-speed; 
- a situation where traffic becomes more dense, then there is insertion of a vehicle in order to illustrate 
automatic deactivation of the system following braking, then reactivation by the driver with the “R” 
button of recall of the memorised speed; 
- increase/decrease of speed limit: illustration of the use of the (+) or (-) buttons by the driver, to adjust 
the requested speed to the speed limit. 
 
2.3 Population 
 
For this study, nine subjects, divided into three groups, were recruited: 
 
Group 1: 3 subjects to whom the basic paper instruction manual was presented; 
Group 2: 3 subjects to whom the paper instruction manual was presented, augmented by a description 
of situations of use; 
Group 3: 3 subjects to whom the film of projection into use was presented. 
 
The subjects were shared out between the three groups in a manner that was homogeneous with 
respect to age and gender. They were all experienced drivers (having each had their driving licenses 
for at least five years) who had declared that they had never driven with a cruise control system before 
the test. 
 
  
Insert figure 1 
 
 
 
Each type of data is described in more detail below. 
 
2.4 Subjective scales 
 
The subjects replied to a set of four subjective continuous scales concerning their trust in the system 
and to related notions that are generally associated to trust in the research literature (Muir, 1994): 
reliability, predictability, efficiency.4 
 
E1: general confidence in the system: “do you have the feeling of trust in the CCS (Cruise Control 
System)?; 
yes, completely ------ no, not at all” 
E2: predictability of the system: “according to you, are the reactions of the system predictable?;  
yes, completely ------ no, not at all” 
E3: reliability of the system: “do you think that the system is safe?  
yes, completely ------ no, not at all” 
E4: perception of the system’s efficiency: “according to you, is the CCS efficient for controlling your 
speed? 
yes, completely ------ no, not at all” 
 
These scales were completed by the subjects in three stages: 
T1: evaluation before any presentation of the system. We thus collect a judgement derived from a 
priori beliefs of the user about cruise control systems that he has not yet used but about which he has 
heard of. 
T2: evaluation at the outcome of the presentation of instructions in one of the three forms. 
T3: evaluation at the outcome of free driving of the system on a journey on the open road of around 
one hour. 
T1 and T2 correspond to a priori trust of type 1, based on indirect information (Numan, 1998; 
Rajaonah, 2003), T3 corresponds to trust of type 2 which is based on experience of use. 
 
2.5 Filmed driving activity 
 
After an initial discovery session of around ten minutes, carried out on a protected circuit without 
traffic, a journey of around one hour on the road was undertaken. One third of it was composed of fast 
roads, and a final third of driving in a semi-urban context. 
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 The time of driving was planned in a way so as to obtain relatively reliable and constant traffic for 
subjects. The drivers were reminded to respect speed limits and to try to use the system that had been 
presented to them when it appeared to be opportune. 
Four cameras were integrated into the car, filming four different viewpoints: (1) a subjective view, 
corresponding to a view close to what the subject would see in the situation, i.e. essentially the exterior 
scene from the front; (2) a view of the cruise control system screen; (3) a view on the face and torso of 
the driver; (4) a view of the pedals. The two first views were used for the self-confrontation interview. 
The filmed driving is mainly used for the self-confrontation interviews, but also for studying the 
exploratory usage as observed in the video. 
 
2.6 Self-confrontation interviews 
 
The use of interviews seems essential to us in order to understand the activity of the subject from his 
own point of view and to shed light on unclear points of the activity that one could only delimit thanks 
to subjects’ verbalisations, such as: felt emotions that are not externalised, motivations towards action, 
diverse mental activities that are not directly inferable from observables and that one can only come 
close to by questioning the subjects with certain methodological precautions, and above all, whilst 
taking care to put subjects back into memorial contact with the situations they describe. 
These interviews were carried out using the videos of the driving activity. After the test in real driving 
conditions, the subjects were placed facing the videos recorded during the driving phase. Only the 
“subjective” and “system screen” views were presented to the subject during the self-confrontation 
interviews, in a manner so that the recently occurring driving situation was reconstituted. 
With each major evolution of the driving situation linked to the use of the cruise control system, 
whether involving a modification of the state of the system (e.g. start-up on the road or disconnection 
of the system by the driver) or of the driving situation (e.g. entry onto a fast road), the video was 
paused, and an interview phase was carried out (largely inspired by techniques of Explicitation 
Interview developed by Vermersch; cf. Cahour, 2008) on what was experienced during the sequence 
encountered by the subject. Subjects were told that as soon as they remembered an element of what 
they had thought, perceived, felt or otherwise, at the moment of the driving activity that they were 
watching, the researcher would stop the video. 
The “Explicitation Interview” (Vermersch, 1994; Depraz et al., 2002) is a specific questioning 
technique that aims to bring the interviewee as close as possible to the specific situation that was lived, 
in a psycho-phenomenological perspective, and which avoids, by the type of interviewer interventions 
which help the vivid recall, the possible biases whereby interviewers orient responses and subjects 
engage in reconstructions and rationalisations. The lived experience that is targeted is just as much of 
a cognitive nature as affective or corporeal (Cahour et al., 2005). 
Lots of researches focus now on the “user experience” and we use here a specific methodology for 
documenting it, with specific methods of verbalization (self-confrontation with Vermersch’s mode of 
questioning). 
 
2.7 Questions on the functions of the system 
 
After the self-confrontation interviews had been completed, the subjects were asked questions on their 
understanding of the principal functions of the control system (commands and displays). The aim was 
to determine whether the different modes of presentation of the system had an influence on the 
representation of it that the subjects constructed, and on their understanding of the tool. The following 
are examples of the eight questions asked: 
- According to you, how does one know that the control system is active/passive? 
 - How does one disconnect the control system? 
- How does one record the advised speed? … 
 
The extent to which the three groups of subjects differ with respect to these questions on 
understanding of the system will be seen below. 
 
3. Results 
 
The data analysis presents the quantitative results along the three scales of trust evaluation that show 
significant differences, then qualitative results of interviews, the set of which aims to specify the 
impact of modes of presentation on the evolution of trust and on the use of the new system. 
 
3.1 Evaluations of trust and associated dimensions 
 
The question asked here concerns evolution of trust and associated dimensions (predictability, 
reliability, efficiency) as they have been estimated on a specific scale, as a function of the three modes 
of presentation of the system, and according to the three successive phases of the experiment: a priori, 
after presentation of the system, and after effective use in real driving. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 
 
Firstly, one notes that the evaluations of predictability and of reliability show no significant change 
across the three phases of the experiment (and according to the three modes of presentation). We shall 
therefore go into more detail below concerning the two other scales. 
 
3.1.1 Evolutions in trust in the system 
 
We expected that the viewing of the use-oriented film would immediately improve trust accorded to 
the system. In effect, trust is generally linked to predictability, and the presentations with delicate 
situations (G2 and G3) warned users of these situations that could surprise them; our hypothesis was 
that, having very complete information on use, the subjects would feel reassured and confident in the 
system. 
However, as a first result, we observe a significant lowering (p= 0.05) of average confidence with the 
presentation of instructions (all instructions taken together). 
We remark that this lowering is followed by an increase that is also significant (p= 0.05), after the test 
in real driving conditions. 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 
  
 
 
 
Reminder: The G1 subjects read a basic written user manual; the G2 subjects read a use-oriented 
paper manual; the G3 subjects saw a “projection into use” film; between T1 and T2, the system was 
presented to subjects, and between T2 and T3, use in driving was carried out. 
 
On Figure 1, one can observe a more marked change for group 3 of this lowering of trust after the 
presentation and of the augmentation after use 5. One could thus think that the film of projection into 
use, that gives a more realistic vision of the system than the two other sets of instructions, makes 
subjects more wary with respect to a priori beliefs about the system. The presentation would thus play 
an important role of a “forewarning” with respect to use, which is undoubtedly not as simple as what 
the subjects could estimate a priori (this more realistic representation of the system will be explained 
in more depth by the qualitative analyses). It is interesting to note that these decreases in the 
estimation of trust go up again after the effective trying out, at least to the level of the a priori 
estimation, and more strongly than the other presentations. 
 
3.1.2 Evolution of the judgement of efficiency 
 
One observes a significant decrease (p= 0.023) of the perception of efficiency of the regulator for 
controlling speed from the very beginning of the experiment, before any presentation (T1) to the 
outcome of the real test (T3). On Figure 2, this general effect is observed differently according to the 
type of presentation of the system (cf note 6): the first two groups (paper instruction manual) become 
conscious of the fact that, only after use, the regulator does not limit speed in all circumstances, 
whereas group 3 becomes conscious of this immediately after watching the film. 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
 
In this case also one could think that the film allows the subjects to construct a representation that is 
closer to real use; the subjects of group 3 anticipate the limits of efficiency of the system and more 
rapidly come to grips with the reality of the proposed system, which can disappoint them suddenly 
more than in use. One can see on the curves that evaluation tends to increase slightly with use whereas 
it tends to decrease for G1 and G2. 
With projection into use in the form of a film (G3), subjects could be constructing a more adequate 
representation of the domain of utility with such help, that is more restricted that what is imagined 
from the beginning by drivers (for example, they realise that in a situation of dense traffic, the system 
is not very efficient since they have to reconnect frequently after braking). 
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 The qualitative analysis of the self-confrontation interviews that follows aims at studying the lived 
experience of the cruise control system in a situation of use. In particular, we shall put the emphasis on 
explaining whether the lowering of trust after the presentation of the system (in particular, with the 
film presentation) subsequently restrains the action of the subjects in situations of use, taking into 
account the distrust that is induced, or whether, to the contrary, the realism that it gives rise to allows 
them to better know and explore the system. 
 
3.2 Qualitative analyses of (dis)trust in the self-confrontation interviews 
 
The analysis of self-confrontation interviews, carried out using the videos of the activity that served as 
a support for them, allows us to approach the feelings of (dis)trust in a manner that is situated in the 
action that is in the process of becoming realised, and to link these to precise elements of the situation.  
 
In this section we present: 
- qualitative indicators of (dis)trust linked to affects and feelings, verbalised expectation failures and 
misunderstandings, with extracts of interviews of situations that generate distrust; 
- examples of more exploratory uses of groups G2 and G3; 
- examples of distorting reconstructions, verbalised by groups G1 and G2; 
- levels of understandings of the system after use. 
 
In a first period of analysis, the interviews have been condensed with the help of a coding system that 
defines patterns of activities in situation, composed of the following different elements verbalised by 
the user; this coding system has been developed from the content of interviews. We distinguish (1) 
actions that depend on the perception of context, intentions that were previously elaborated, and 
perceptions of effects of actions, (2) affective states and physical sensations that will influence actions 
and mental activities, (3) mental activities (evaluations, expectations, other reflexions and inferences). 
- perceptions in situational context (“I was going down a slope”) 
- intentions (“I wanted to see how the car would react”) 
- actions (“I had switched on the control system”) 
- perceptions of the effects of actions (“I see that it went to 50 and not 52”) 
- affective states (“I was surprised; I was not reassured”) 
- physical sensations (“The pedal felt soft and spongy”) 
- evaluations of the situation or of the system (“It was risky”) 
- expectations and anticipations (“I thought that the car was going to brake”) 
- other reflexions or inferences: they include notably explanatory hypotheses (“I ask myself if I gave it 
a shot on the brake pedal”) and misunderstandings and questions of the subject on diverse aspects of 
use. 
 
3.2.1 Qualitative indicators of (dis)trust and problematic situations 
 
Amongst the elements described by the users of the cruise control system, several are potential 
indicators of the feeling of (dis)trust that is undergoing construction little by little, and which is 
complex to identify since it is rarely verbalised directly. This feeling can sometimes be expressed 
 indirectly, but how to know how to ‘see behind’ varied expressions must also be determined. Notably, 
affective states and evaluations having an affective connotation are relatively direct indications of 
(dis)trust, and failed expectations and misunderstandings are potential indicators of distrust. 
 
3.2.1.1. Direct indicators linked to affects and feelings 
- Expressed affective states 6 : the expression of negative affective states indicates to us that the subject 
does not feel at ease with respect to an element of the situation of use. One finds numerous 
expressions of this type in our corpus: negative affective states such as “not reassured”, “uneasy”, 
“inconvenienced by the system”, “annoyed”, “surprised”, “astonished”, “disoriented”, “disappointed”, 
“disconcerted”, “worried”, “stressed”, (and of course, “not confident”) allow us to identify elements of 
the situation that can participate in a feeling of distrust; to the contrary, expressions such as 
“confident”, “at ease”, “peaceful”, are examples of affective states that indicate that the subject is 
rather at ease. 
- Evaluations of the situation are sometimes another way of expressing affective elements linked to 
(dis)trust: “it’s bizarre”, “I don’t like that”, “it’s astonishing”, “it’s annoying”, “it’s not normal”, “it’s 
not restful”, “it’s comforting”, are for example expressions that tell about relations that the subject has 
with the phenomenon in question, links that can participate in a more global feeling (or one that is 
localised to certain actions and situations) of trust or wariness. 
 
3.2.1.2. Potential indicators of a cognitive nature 
- disappointed expectations and anticipations: they are a potential source of distrust vis-à-vis the 
system. When the subject expects a certain reaction from the system and observes a different one, 
potentially, there is mistrust that arises; negative affects are generally associated with this. 
Expectations and anticipations are directly linked to the dimension of predictability of the notion of 
trust. 
- Misunderstandings, uncertainties and questions with respect to the functioning of the system; the 
subject who does not understand the links between his actions and the reactions of the system, for 
example, and constructs a relation of trust; one observes this misunderstanding by the fact that the 
subject poses several questions or from the fact that he says explicitly “there, I do not understand”. 
These misunderstandings are sometimes expressed in association with affective states (“I didn’t 
understand and that worried me”). 
 
3.2.1.3 Qualitative analysis of distrust situations 
 
The following examples are drawn from the self-confrontation interview corpus and illustrate these 
different indicators of (dis)trust (in italics) and the types of situations that provoke them: situations of 
exceeding the speed limit, situations of overtaking a vehicle and situations of gaps between the real 
speed and the displayed speed. 
 
                                                          
6 Most authors in psychology (e.g. Oatley & Jenkins 1996) distinguish the “basic emotions” which have an important 
physiological and expressive component, from the moods (lasting longer), feelings/sentiments (like friendship, love, 
trust,…); we consider here all the affective states, including basic emotions and more complex sentiments, which are relevant 
in regard to the activity and situation. We do not follow Damasio’s definitions of emotions as not being conscious, and 
feelings/sentiments as being conscious (Damasio 2003). 
 A) Situation of excess speed 
 
After having fixed an advised speed, when a subject accelerates or is going downhill, and the real 
speed exceeds the advised speed, he is therefore in “excess speed” or “over-speed”; a red band lights 
up to signal this to him, but the system does not deactivate itself, and takes over control when the 
vehicle comes back to the advised speed. However, novice users often expect that the cruise controller 
will stop them from going beyond the requested speed (but automatic braking is technically too 
costly). One sees in the following descriptions by different drivers that this disappointed expectation in 
the case of over-speed, poses problems to subjects who say that they are “surprised”, “disappointed”, 
“untrusting”. 
 
N.B.: patterns of situations presented here take up a “selected verbatim” of verbalisations of subjects, 
in other words that the groups of words are selected, and not always the complete sentences, with their 
hesitations, reformulations, etc. 
 
In the example 1, one observes that the subject, remarking that his vehicle exceeds the advised speed, 
expresses his disappointment and his lack of confidence given the fact that the system does not do 
what he asked it to, which implicitly calls its reliability, efficiency and predictability into question; it 
seems that the subject had not perceived that he was going downhill or had not understood the fact that 
the system did not brake. In the same kind of idea, another subject (example 2) also expressed his 
surprise to see that the requested speed was exceeded, given that he had effectively perceived that he 
was going downhill, and he inferred from this a problem for respecting the speed limit. 
 
Example 1 
Action = “I asked for 69” 
Context perception = “and all of a sudden it is 76; the red bar lights up” 
Evaluation = “thus for me control is not carried out” 
Affect = … (sigh) … “I am a bit disappointed by the system; I do not have confidence in the system, 
not on the level of security but on the level of not doing what I asked it to do”. 
 
Example 2 
Context = “I see that we’re going down a slight hill” 
Affect =  “I was surprised to see that we were going faster than the speed I asked for” 
Inference = “you should not use the control system for radar speed detectors since they often put them 
going downhill” 
 
There again (example 3), the subject says that he is “surprised”, “disappointed”, and finds it “a bit 
strange” to be able to exceed the advised speed. The expression “I thought that the car was going to 
brake” clearly indicates a disappointed expectation, which allows one to suppose that trust is 
threatened. It must be emphasised that the fact that on several occasions subjects expressed their 
disappointment and lowering of confidence is not due to a feeling of risk of accident, but rather above 
all to the fact that they are unable to predict the reaction of the system. 
Example 3 
Action = “I’m coming out of the roundabout; I put on the R again with the button” 
 Context = “I am at 57; the advised was 52 and the red bar is lit up because I went beyond it” 
Affect = “at there, surprise” 
Reflexion/expectation = “I thought that the car was going to brake automatically; I said to myself that 
it should brake automatically or at least control it in the direction of lowering speed, this being 
something I did not feel” 
Sensation = “perhaps the machine does it, but I did not feel this phenomenon” 
Affect = “I do not feel in danger but I am a bit disappointed; it seemed to me to be a bit strange” 
 
B) Situation of overtaking a vehicle 
 
The situation of overtaking a vehicle does not pose a specific problem with the speed regulator, but 
subjects do not feel confident with it because they do not know how to precisely anticipate how their 
vehicle is going to react with the regulator. They know that when they brake it will deactivate, but they 
do not always have clearly in mind the fact that they can also go beyond the advised speed by 
accelerating whenever they want to. Thus, the two subjects described their hesitation, embarrassment, 
tensing up, being blocked and fear when they wanted to overtake. It should be emphasised that we are 
here in a situation of first use of the system, and that trust can be established over time. 
Example 4 
Perception of context: “I was the one who had to pull back in” 
Action = “I didn’t know what to do; either brake, or else accelerate and go past; I had a period of 
hesitation that I found enormous” 
Affect = “I felt a bit awkward with the system; the fact that it was assisted by something disturbed me; 
I was a bit tensed up” 
Perception/expectation of effects = “I didn’t know how the car was going to react” 
Affect = “so at that instant it made me feel blocked” 
Action 2 = “I ended up by braking then afterwards I re-accelerated because I had seen that it had cut 
out (the control system, given the fact of braking) and I felt that I was no longer pulled forwards” 
 
Example 5 
Affect/expectation = “My fear was to find myself stuck to the ass of a lorry, of wanting to overtake 
and that the control system was going to prevent me; an anxiety but when I say anxiety .. I feel myself 
neither in difficulty nor in danger …” 
Action = “I perhaps pressed down a bit more on the accelerator pedal” 
Intention = “to see if the fact of pressing on this pedal was going to allow me to go beyond the advised 
speed.” 
 
C) Situation of difference between the real speed and the displayed speed 
 
In the following example, a subject describes a slight difference, produced by the prototype, between 
the speed that the subject wants to record whilst driving (his current speed) and that which is displayed 
and recorded by the system; this produces surprise, misunderstanding and stress (thus negative 
evaluations and affects, in addition to misunderstanding) and a “loss of confidence”. The fear here is 
above all a fear of exceeding the speed limit. 
 Example 6 
Action = “I switch on the system, I’ve pushed on the button (to start up the cruise controller)” 
Perception of context = “I was doing 52 km/h according to the speedometer” 
Perception of effects = “it put it to 50 and not 52!” … “I had this impression several times afterwards, 
always a difference; it shows 107 when I`m driving at 110” 
Affects/evaluations = “it’s bizarre, I don’t understand; it’s astonishing, I expected that there would be 
the same thing; I don’t understand” 
 
Two other subjects state, with respect to the same event: 
- “I am not respecting the highway code since I am above (the allowed speed) so it stresses me” 
- “For me it is not right; I don’t trust it in matters of legislation, lack of security is another thing; I put 
that in order to get some peace and I find out that I’m above the speed limit; if you have to have your 
eyes glued to this system all the time, that means a loss of confidence in it.” 
We have seen with these examples three sources of distrust and the indicators of this distrust in the 
discourse of the users expressing negative affects and evaluations, disappointed expectations and 
misunderstandings of the system. 
 
3.2.2 A more exploratory use by groups 2 and 3 
 
3.2.2.1 Qualitative analysis of the exploratory behavior 
It is interesting to point out that one can find more exploratory behaviour in groups 2 and 3, who have 
benefited from a use-oriented presentation, than in group 1, which had read the standard user manual. 
Previously, we asked the question as to whether the general lowering of confidence after the 
presentations of the system, would inhibit use or not; we shall therefore see here some elements of 
responses to this question. Two examples of exploratory behaviour are presented below, with (in 
italic) the linguistic indicators that allow us to identify exploratory behaviour. We shall see that in 
addition, the situations explored by the subjects G2 and G3 are quite specific functions, which are 
rarely used by the complete set of subjects (like the advised speed recall function). 
 
In the following, a subject describes how he explores the speed recall (R) function in order to see how 
the vehicle will accelerate automatically to attain the requested speed. This function is only explored 
by one subject of group 1, whereas it is used often (two or three times) by all the subjects of groups 2 
and 3. 
 
Example 7 / Group 2 
Action/test = “I did it a little bit on purpose to press on the button again (R, the advised speed recall) 
although I was not yet up to 110, to see how it would get there (up to 110)” 
Perception effect = “I had felt it accelerate all by itself, not an incredible acceleration, but from the 
sensation of feeling it going, to see myself approaching other cars... you don’t control your 
acceleration; I felt myself a bit pulled forward” 
Affect = “it feels strange; for the moment, it didn’t make me feel too stressed” 
 
 The following subject (ex.8) was trying to use a function that did not exist in the tested prototype: 
when he was in over-speed, and thus the cruise controller remains activated on a lower speed, he can 
increase his requested speed with the “+” button, or lower it with the “- ” button; what he is trying to 
do here is to press on the R button to memorise his current speed as the advised speed, which is not 
possible, although it might be an interesting function. One thus observes a creative exploration in the 
case of this subject of group 3, which presupposes that he felt sufficiently confident with the rest of the 
manipulations. More generally, this function for recalling a pre-selected speed is not used by the 
subjects of group 1. 
 
Example 8 / Group 3 
Action/hypothesis = “there I tried something, it’s that since I’m in over-speed, if I press on the R 
button, it will perhaps change the advised speed, rather than pressing on + or -, and put me in the speed 
I’m presently in” 
Effect = “and in the end, it doesn’t work” 
Evaluation = “so I say to myself that it would have been good if ... accelerating the regulation without 
using the + or – buttons because 2 kph on each time, I find that a bit slow” 
 
The subjects of groups G2 and G3, to whom the system had been presented with difficult situations of 
use (in a written or film form) thus explored to a greater extent the possibilities and limits of the 
system. We have not observed such behaviour in G1. 
 
3.2.2.2 Quantitative analysis of a function use  
 
The video were also analysed to precise the behaviour relative to the exploratory use by the three 
groups of subjects. Apart from the basic functions, some functions are more complex and more rarely 
used by the drivers. That is the case of (1) the function “Resume” (R control) to recall the target speed, 
which is one of the two procedures for reactivating the system after a suspension: resuming the 
previous target speed with R control or setting a new target speed (using the + control). A study of 
Brouwer & Hoedemaeker (2004) shows that beginners tend to have difficulties in understanding the 
specificity or the R function (compared to the + control) ; another study conducted by Renault (Pagot 
& Rabardel 2008) on the use of the Cruise control system by beginners, intermediary users and 
experts, indicates that beginners use it very rarely compared to intermediary and experts users. From 
these results we can state that the Resume function is complex and difficult to master. 
On the video of the real situation of driving, we quantified the number of occurrences of the use of this 
Resume function. 
Use of the function “Resume”: 
G1 : 2 occurrences by 2 subjects 
G2 : 13 occurrences by 3 subjects 
G3 : 10 occurrences by 3 subjects 
We observe very few occurrences of the use of the R function by subjects of the group 1 (basic paper 
instruction) compared to the groups 2 and 3. There is then a direct effect of the use-oriented 
instructions on the exploration of a complex function like the Resume one. Such a difference between 
the groups is not observed for the reactivation function with the (+). 
 
3.2.3 Distorting reconstructions for groups 1 and 2 
  
One observes more distorting reconstructions of the functioning of the system in groups 1 and 2, 
contrary to group 3. From this one can infer that the representations constructed after having watched 
the film are clearer than those that are elaborated after having read the written instructions. In group 3, 
subjects possibly pose questions on elements that they do not understand, or have doubts concerning 
certain reactions of the system, but do not go as far as constructing representations that distort the 
reality of the system.  
 
In the following extract, a user notices that the red band that indicates over-speed lights up, and 
remarks that the regulator has deactivated itself (following braking about which he is not aware, but 
which can be observed on the video). On the spot, he creates a rule which consists in thinking that the 
regulator deactivates itself when the advised speed is exceeded by 5 kph, which is erroneous. More 
generally, involuntary over-speed (on a slope, and not by depression of the accelerator pedal) is very 
badly understood by the G1 subjects, who do not associate it with the slope, whereas for G2 and G3 
subjects, it is well understood but badly accepted. This example also indicates the lack of 
understanding and the surprise that are due to slight breaking, that is automatic and not always easy to 
bring into consciousness, which provokes deactivation of the regulator for security reasons. This 
hitherto unexplained deactivation can give rise to distrust, where reliability and efficiency of the 
system are called into question. 
 
Example 9 / Group 1 
Perception context + affect = “the red band surprised me, the fact that it lit up” 
Perception context/effect = “the regulator disconnected itself, I got back the mobility of the 
accelerator; I went over it by 5 kph (the advised speed); I’m not responsible for it” 
Question = “I don’t think I hit the brake at all; isn’t it surely after 5 kph that the regulator is 
triggered?” 
 
Below (ex.10), the driver (a woman) of G2 thought she had read that if one brakes and disconnects the 
regulator, it subsequently reactivates itself when one accelerates. Although use indicates to her that her 
representation is erroneous, and she attributes this to the fact that she always reads superficially. This 
example is interesting since it indicates that for certain subjects, who have a tendency of only getting a 
quick overview of their user manuals, the film presentation, that forces subjects to see everything, 
would be more appropriate. In this case, the reader had created a rule of functioning that did not exist; 
this is thus a case of a distorting reconstruction. 
 
Example 10 / Group 2 
Intention = “what mattered to me at the beginning was to know how you disconnected and switched it 
on” 
Affect = “because I’m not very confident in the system in fact, that didn’t reassure me much” 
Action + evaluation = “I had re-read the instruction manual; I said to myself it’s fine, I’ve understood” 
Reflexion/memory = “I thought I had read that in re-accelerating normally it switched itself on again, 
it seems to me that I read that, after having braked, in re-accelerating, it put itself back to the 
(requested) speed; the problem is that I always read fast and superficially, always too fast” 
Action = “I tried two to three times” 
Evaluation = “it did not work; so it was then that I understood that I had understood nothing at all”. 
  
3.2.4  A differentiated level of understanding of the system 
 
At the end of the self-confrontation interview, the subjects were asked orally to quickly recapitulate 
knowledge about the functioning of the system. Differences between groups were also found on this 
level, which indicates that the G3 subjects (having seen the film of projection into use) have a more 
complete understanding of the system. 
Certain questions did not discriminate between the groups, these being the most simple ones, those 
that could only give rise to a very limited number of responses (for example, Q5: how does one know 
that one is in over-ride?). Conversely, other question that could generate more diversified responses 
(such as Q4: how do you come back to the previous settings? or Q6: how does one know that the 
regulator is in/active?) led to more complete responses with the subjects of group 2, and above all with 
those of group 3. 
For example, with the two previously mentioned questions, only the subjects of group 3 made 
reference to the required condition of minimum speed (30 kph in order to activate the regulator) or 
described the relevant set of indicators for distinguishing states (which could go as far as description 
of very precise indicators, such as the hardness of the pedal or the behaviour of the vehicle). 
Finally, to the question Q8 (Have you other questions on the use or the functioning of the regulator?) 
one can distinguish two types of questions: those relative to the functioning of the system, and those, 
at a higher level, relative to design choices. The subjects of group 3 posed questions that did not seem 
to be on the same level as the others. They did not bear on questions relating to understanding the 
functioning of the system, but rather related more to questions on the design choices (e.g. Why doesn’t 
it brake? Why doesn’t it start up again after an acceleration? Why can’t you input the requested speed 
in over-ride?). 
Finally, more generally, the dissymmetry of functioning between acceleration and deceleration posed 
numerous problems for these drivers during the discovery phase, and generated difficulties in 
anticipation and understanding, and therefore mistrust7. Even if such dissymmetry is justified for 
reasons of security, it remains no less true that there is a radical gap between it with respect to the 
spontaneous expectations of users concerning the functioning of the system. Another cause of 
disappointment comes from the domain of restricted utility with respect to what is spontaneously 
expected and wanted. Whilst the subjects had very well perceived the point, with respect to security, of 
disconnecting the system when they hit the brake pedal, the repeated necessity of re-starting the 
system in situations of quite dense traffic ended up by being too tedious to justify the use of the system 
in these situations. 
As we insisted above, the states of the system can, in a more or less prolonged way, be outside the 
field of consciousness of the driver. We have seen this for braking in order to make small adjustments 
to speed, and for over-speeds that are not decided on the drivers’ initiative (slopes). Given that light 
braking is a brief and automatic action, it escapes from conscious awareness; in the same way, drivers 
are not always aware of the fact that they are going downhill. 
The consequences of breaking, which is in the state of deactivation of the system, are thus frequently 
neglected by drivers. From this, a frequent discrepancy results, between the state expected of the 
system (being always in regulation) and its real state (disconnection), which contributes on one hand 
to stimulating numerous questions on the state of the system and its causes, and, on the other hand, to 
                                                          
7 e.g. the brake interrupts the regulation but not the acceleration, successive pressing on the (+) key produces acceleration 
whereas this same action on the (–) key does not act upon the brakes, the (+) key allows to enter into cruise control from the 
current speed, but not with the (-) key. 
 requiring a repeated need (that is perceived as detrimental) for visual control on the display. These 
sources of discomfort do not help to create confidence in the system. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
From the point of view of the user, leaving a system to regulate the speed of his own vehicle requires 
delegating a part of control over an essential function of driving, which is not without risk for the 
driver. In man-machine, as in inter-human interactions, trust is an affective feeling, linked to appraisal 
of reliability and predictability, that is indispensable for accepting to depend upon another, whether 
human or machine, without emotional discomfort. This emotional comfort is central for accepting to 
use an assistance system (Cahour 2008) and if one distrust the system he/she will feel uncomfortable. 
Here we focussed on (dis)trust towards a cruise control system, and on the tranquillity of subjects with 
respect to the fact that the system is not going to put them into dangerous situations (danger of having 
an accident, of being outside the law, of behaving in a non-civic manner). We studied here the 
confidence in the system but it must be emphasised that self-confidence is an equally important 
element in this relation towards automation, and that an experienced driver would without doubt be 
more rapidly feel confident with the system than a more generally cautious or timid driver would; 
certain authors also distinguish the confidence that is felt in the relation towards the system. 
Nevertheless, it seems to us to be difficult to distinguish these different elements from each other in 
the verbal protocols, as well as using measurement scales, especially in a first trial of the system. What 
people describe is more of the order of the interaction that they entertain with an aspect of the system, 
then a mix of the three types of confidence: I do not totally master and anticipate the functioning of the 
system (self-confidence), and so I do not trust it (trust in the system) and I do not trust the use that I 
can put it to (trust in the relation), each of the three being intimately intertwined with the others. 
The objective of this experiment was to experiment a new type of accompaniment for initial use of an 
assistance for driving, with as a general hypothesis that projection into use based on a film support 
would allow trust in the system to be improved, as well as greater exploration during the first trying 
out of the system, together with better understanding of the functions of the system at the end of the 
first use of it. 
Our results indicate that the presentation of instructions (whether in the form of a film or otherwise) 
lowers the evaluation of trust (and of efficiency) that conductors have a priori, which indicates that, on 
the basis of little information, they construct a representation of a cruise control system that is rather 
idealistic, and realise, after reading of the instructions, and above all after having watched a film, that 
its use is not so obvious as they had previously thought. There is thenceforth a drop in trust that 
nevertheless goes up again after use of the system during driving. The same thing happens with 
evaluation of efficiency of the system for regulating speed, whereas reliability and predictability do 
not evolve significantly. We remark nevertheless, from qualitative analyses of use of the regulator in 
real driving conditions, and from the lived experience of this use by subjects, that this drop in trust in 
the system does not inhibit subjects in their use, and in particular, for subjects who have watched a 
film of projection into use. They explore (subjects of the G2 group) more of the functions of the 
system in driving conditions, they invent less than groups 1 and 2 ways functioning of the system that 
do not exist (distorted reconstructions), and they have a deeper level of understanding of the system. 
However, we have remarked inter-individual differences, and our exploratory study should be 
developed further with a larger number of subjects. 
We conclude that instructions have an important role in warning subjects, which is a bit more 
disappointing than what they imagined, and that the showing of the film of projection into use 
provides a more complete contextual support which prevents the superficial reading we had observed 
with certain subjects, and which lends itself less to imagination and reconstruction of the context; in 
effect, with the film the visual dimension is not reconstructed mentally, but is well rendered 
objectively on the screen. One could say that the space for imagination is less with watching a film 
 than it is in reading a text. Also with the film, the subject can project himself in the situation of use 
and, even if this is a less efficient training than the effective use recommended by Sarter & al (1997), it 
gets nearer to the use, and it is more realistic with such a general public product. 
(Dis)trust must be considered as a feeling that is in constant evolution, and, supposing that the 
distinction between a priori trust (type 1) and trust constructed by experience (type 2) is relevant, it 
must be possible to refine this categorisation since we can see here the differences constructed 
between trust of type 1 (a priori - by hearsay, essentially) and trust of type 2 (after more complete 
presentation of the system). In the distinction between the two, the quantity of information that the 
subject has available is of course at stake, which is very superficial in the first case, and quite complete 
in the second, with a continuum between the two. Likewise for type 2 trust, concerning which we have 
only explored the initial familiarisation with, and use of the system; thus the question of the evolution 
of this use, of learning and appropriation that can unfold subsequently, is obviously raised. In this case 
also there are sub-categories of type 2 trust, that are distinguished from each other according to the 
duration of the experience of use. The fact that we were not able to explore this evolving aspect of use 
is of course a limitation of our work. Yet we justify this focus on initial use by the fact that drivers 
seem to be capable of becoming discouraged after a first use, and from then onwards never activate 
their systems, even if they keep them available to themselves. It is thus essential to record what 
happens during the first moments of use. 
In this study we focussed on negative aspects (these being greater priorities within the objectives of an 
ergonomic evaluation-design of the system), but it must be emphasised that several positive aspects of 
the cruise control system were also expressed by the subjects, notably the comfort of its use on roads 
that are relatively flat without much traffic (such as motorways) where they did not have to worry 
about controlling their speed. Once the driver has understood the favourable contexts of use and some 
particularities of the system, the limits of the system seem more reduced than the limits of the human 
ability. Without the system, the driver needs to have very frequent visual checks, which are costly, for 
controlling the speed of his vehicle. In general, the functions of the cruise control systems are 
appreciated, especially with the reinforcement of the speed regulation. A study performed within the 
European project AIDE (Lheureux & al, 2004) indicates that seventy percent of the owners of a cruise 
control system state that they regularly use the system (associated or not to the use of a speed limiter), 
and twenty percent use none. It is then largely used and perceived as an advantage in some conditions, 
especially since the legislation on speed limitation has been reinforced.  
Finally, this work insists on the fact that for research in ergonomics that is concerned with evaluation 
and design of systems, it is important to take the lived experience of users into account, together with 
its affective dimensions (feelings of trust but also diverse emotions) which provide us with 
information on the relationship that subjects maintain with certain precise elements of the system, and 
on their desires to use it, together with the degree of emotional comfort that they experience in so 
doing. We have shown here how (dis)trust is linked to expectations and misunderstandings of subjects, 
as well as how it is expressed by emotions and diverse feelings. These subjective aspects of the 
activity can only be studied within a clinical perspective with the subjects verbalizing their experience 
of use. The subjective scales only give us an idea of the global trust but not of the origins of this 
trust/distrust in the situation of use, which is the main point of interest for designing or re-designing 
appropriate tools. 
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Figure 1  
Diagram of temporal sequencing of data collection: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  
Comparative statistics (t of Student of paired groups) 
 
 
Scales headings 
T1 
Average     S.D. 
T2 
Average    S.D. 
T3 
  Average    S.D. 
E1 : Trust   83,8          16,1  72,6         24,6    85,5          9,7 
E2 : Reliability   70,9          21,5   82,1         11,0    77,3        21,4 
E3 : Predictability   79,1          15,2   76,7         16,3    75,6        21,1 
E4 : Efficiency   91,5           6,9   83,7           7,3    77,8        16,1 
 
 
 
Scales headings Comparison 
T1 –T2 
Comparison 
T2 –T3 
Comparison 
T1 –T3 
E1 : Trust p=0,049 p=0,048 N.S. 
E2 : Reliability N.S. N.S. N.S. 
E3 : Predictability N.S N.S N.S 
E4 : Efficiency N.S N.S p=0,024 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of the trust averages according to the presentation 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Evolution of the feeling of the system efficiency averages according to the presentation 
 
 
 
